This paper deals with the detection and prediction of losses due to cyber attacks waged on vital networks. The accumulation of losses to a network during a series of attacks is modeled by a 2-dimensional monotone random walk process as observed by an independent delayed renewal process. The first component of the process is associated with the number of nodes 
to disconnect the intact portion of a network from the rest of it before incurring critical damage, but how does one recognize the threat and manage the network once an attack begins? In this article we lay out a foundation for predicting the time and caliber of potentially destructive damage to a network by means of statistics and operational calculus.
Once an attack is launched, we seek to determine how much damage it will potentially cause and the time until a specified critical amount of damage is incurred. We model processes of attacks and cumulative losses of nodes and weights to predict both the time and size of critical damage.
Further, we embellish the basic model by adding an auxiliary robustness threshold and analyze the fluctuation of the process about this intermediate threshold prior to entering a critical stage, which yields a more refined analysis of the nature of the accumulation of damage. This allows one to rank various risks to the network by considering the time between threshold crossings, which may, for example, be applied to early detection of hostile attacks and differentiation between attacks and benign hardware failures. Values of the thresholds can be determined heuristically, through optimization, or monitored upon the observation of incoming damage.
Modeling Networks. As mentioned, networks can be modeled by graphs, and particularly weighted graphs, in which each edge or node is associated with a weight representing, for example, cost, bandwidth, distance, strength of social ties, energy, gravitational force, liquidity in financial networks, or probabilities. Random graphs are also commonly used, e.g. classical Erdös-Rènyi random graphs consist of n vertices with M edges chosen uniformly at random from all possible adjacencies, but we instead consider graphs with random node weights whose original structure can further be randomly altered.
It is often thought that cyber attacks spread from one node to another along the graph as a branching process, but this is an incomplete picture for several reasons. Firstly, attacks often have multiple simultaneous targets (e.g. machines linked to a targeted router or servers housing virtualized machines) or victims quarantine groups of machines in response to attack detection, both of which result in batch losses. Further, the viral aspect of cyber attacks is significantly mitigated by firewalls, and viral attacks that do elude firewalls tend to practically immediately infect subnetworks (due to the structure of highly interconnected clusters that characterizes large-scale networks). Lastly, some of the most prevalent attacks are not necessarily viral at all (e.g. distributed denial-of-service attacks).
Incoming damage to a network is subject to a complex process. An attack disables successive nodes and edges, effectively removing a subgraph with a random number of nodes with random associated weights (due to both the value of incident edges and intrinsic node value). Furthermore, such a network under attack is observed at potentially random epochs of time, as the losses become apparent. The spread of the damage is one of the most distinctive elements of a hostile action, so we predict its caliber using methods of stochastic analysis. Related Literature. Combating cyber crime involves various mathematical modeling and methods, as well as those of non-mathematical nature (such as prevention, physical and electronic defense mechanisms, and intelligence, which do not pertain to our article). Thus, we mention a few areas of current research on this topic and some literature known to the authors. Random and deterministic graph theory is probably the most common area for studying networking [2, 3, 5, The Layout of the Paper. In Section 2, we begin with a model of a process where attacks occur according to a marked point process in time, with two-dimensional marks representing the cumulative nodes and weight lost up to time t under delayed observation upon random time epochs.
We derive a joint functional of each component as the process (node loss, weight loss, and time) at the first observed exit from [0, M ] × [0, V ] and at one observation prior.
In Section 3, we extend the model to include an auxiliary robustness threshold for the node loss component, M 1 < M . We derive a joint functional of the components of the process at both the first observed exit of the node component from [0, M 1 ], the observed exit of the process from
, and one observation prior to each for the "confined" process, under the restriction that the first observed M 1 crossing precedes the major crossing.
The key technique in preserving the wide generality of our results in Sections 2 and 3 is to derive them under a composition of a number of operators of two types: the Laplace-Carson transform and so-called D-operator, the latter of which is introduced in some past work of one of the co-
authors. Yet the flexibility and tractability of the inverses of these operators allows the reduction of the general formulas to fully explicit formulas for practical cases. We demonstrate this in Sections 4 and 5, where we will derive closed-form, explicit formulas for two sets of realistic probabilistic assumptions. Among other things, we derive explicit probabilistic results, including joint transforms of the process upon the M 1 and major crossings, which yield marginal transforms of each component at each observed crossing time and the time between the two observed crossings.
A Basic Model
Consider an infinite weighted graph in which weights are associated with nodes rather than edges. In reality there are not infinite graphs, but this assumption appropriately models large-scale networks. During a series of attacks, successive batches of nodes are incapacitated upon random time increments. Associated with each node is a random weight representing its value to the health of the network. We suppose the network enters a critical state wherein it may become dysfunctional if the number of nodes incapacitated by hostile attacks exceeds a fixed integer threshold M or the magnitude of weights associated with the compromised nodes exceeds a fixed real threshold W . We proceed with more formalism of the model. Let (Ω, F (Ω) , P ) be a probability space and let
where ε a is a Dirac point measure, be a marked Poisson random measure on this probability space describing the evolution of damage taken to a network, where n k nodes are destroyed at time t k , k = 1, 2, . . . ,
w jk is the nonnegative real weight associated with the n k nodes and the underlying support counting measure ∞ k=1 ε t k is Poisson of rate λ directed by λ |·|, where |·| is the Borel-Lebesgue measure on B (R + ).
We assume that n k 's are iid (and independent of w jk 's) with common marginal PGF (probabilitygenerating function) g (z), and w jk 's are iid with common LST (Laplace-Stieltjes transform) l (u) for j, k ∈ N.
By straightforward probability arguments we obtain the following representation for η in terms of its dependent components N and W:
where T is a Borel subset of R + and |T | denotes the Borel-Lebesgue measure of set T . Now, suppose η is observed by a delayed renewal process
and let
such that
Then, by Lemma A.1 (Appendix) and (2.2),
are the functionals describing the total number of lost nodes and their associated weights observed within time intervals [0, τ 0 ] and (τ 0 , τ 1 ], respectively. Since the increments are iid, the second corresponds to any (τ n−1 , τ n ].
Now, introduce a generic marked delayed renewal process
with mutually dependent components
whose relationship to the network will be explained later. Denote Such an observed process is regarded as "terminated" at time min{τ µ , τ ν }, the first observed passage time, which represents delayed information regarding the actual real-time crossing which occurred earlier.
First, we consider the confined process on trace σ-algebra F (Ω) ∩ {µ < ν}, i.e. the process with component X being terminated first, and thus the first observed passage time τ µ will be the exit time by the confined process. Equation (2.2.9) will be modified as
which gives a more precise definition of the process observed until τ µ . We do the same for the confined processes on F(Ω) ∩ {µ = ν} and F(Ω) ∩ {µ > ν}.
Then, we define the first observed passage index,
Throughout the rest of this section, we consider various marginal and semi-marginal variants of the joint functional
of the observed process upon the first observed passage time τ min{µ,ν} and pre-observed passage time τ min{µ,ν}−1 . The latter is of particular interest due to the crudeness of the observed process.
The following transforms will be vital in the derivation of explicit results in the upcoming sections.
Here LC q is the Laplace-Carson transform:
with the inverse
y is the inverse of the Laplace transform. The operator D p is defined as
where {f (p)} is a sequence, with the inverse
The upcoming results for the joint transforms from (2.15) will be derived under the inverse of composed operator D pq . The utility of D −1 xy is at the heart of the derivation of joint and marginal transforms, which can yield results such as moments and distributions, of the components of process (X ⊗ Y ⊗ T ) µ upon threshold crossings in a fully explicit form.
The below Theorem 2.1 establishes an analytically tractable formula for Φ µ<ν . With (2.7)-(2.8),
we abbreviate
Theorem 2.1. In light of abbreviations (2.22)-(2.27), the functional Φ µ<ν of the process on the trace σ-algebra F (Ω) ∩ {µ < ν} satisfies the following formula:
xy is the inverse of operator D introduced in (2.16).
Proof. Introduce the families of indices
and
In particular, we have
will bypass all terms except 1 {µ(p)<ν(q)} . Thus, after applying the operator D pq to random family 1 {µ(p)=j,ν(q)=k} : p ≥ 0, q ≥ 0 we arrive at
We first notice that
Then, we have
which yields (2.33). Denote
by Fubini's Theorem and (2.37), we have
where
We observe that the marginal distribution of
because after a number of nodes in excess of M are purged at τ µ , the forthcoming events (such as further damage to the network leading to a sure excess of weight above V are so far limited to those on the sub-σ-algebra F(Ω) ∩ {µ < ν}). The corresponding marginal transform of those Y i 's can differ from γ in the next two equations. However, this will not alter the result of the summation of R 3jk R 4k , as we will see. Without loss of generality we omit the corresponding formalism thus having
At this moment, we will suspend the proof to derive and state some results necessary to the completion of the proof of Theorem 2.1.
where any two of the inequalities can be weakened to ≥.
Proof. Consider
Inequality (2.47) holds if each of the two factors in (2.48) is less than one, or in the weaker form, one of the factors equal to one and one is strictly less than one. Let us assume that each factor is less than one. Then, we have Re(θ) > 0 and Re(g (zl (v))) < 1.
, by imposing g (zl (v)) < 1 we ensure that Re(g (zl (v))) < 1, which is true by the Schwarz lemma below if zl (v) < 1, as follows. Finally, z ≤ 1 is the common domain for a pgf like g (z). Imposing z < 1 we can relax Re(l (v)) to be ≥ 0 or Re(θ) ≥ 0.
Notice that upon application of operator D pq of (2.15), the output variables must be restricted to · < 1. Therefore, with Re(θ) ≥ 0, we have convergence. Also observe that Theorem 2.2 can be applied to the norm of γ 0 of (2.7) under minor modifications. Now we continue with the proof of Theorem 2.1. Summing up k>j R 3jk R 4k yields 1 (with ||γ (1, y, 0) || < 1, under a minor sufficient condition given in Theorems 2.2 and 2.3).
j≥0 R 1j R 2j converges by the same argument, yielding
Applying the inverse operator D −1 xy of (2.21) to Ψ (x, y) yields the statement of Theorem 2.1.
Proceeding as in Theorem 2.1, we can find the functionals Φ µ=ν and Φ µ>ν , using some additional notation: the process on the trace σ-algebra F (Ω) ∩ {µ = ν} satisfies the following formula:
Proposition 2.5. In light of abbreviations (2.22)-(2.27) and (2.50)-(2.53), the functional Φ µ>ν of the process on the trace σ-algebra F (Ω) ∩ {µ > ν} satisfies the following formula:
By the linearity of the inverse operator and expectation, the previous 3 results yield the functional of the process no longer confined to a particular ordering of the exit indices:
Corollary 2.6. In light of abbreviations (2.22)-(2.27) and (2.50)-(2.53)), the functional Φ of the process on the σ-algebra F (Ω) satisfies the following formula:
Note that the basic model in this section, in a much more rudimentary form was proposed and studied in Dshalalow [7] and further in Dshalalow and Liew [9] .
An Auxiliary Threshold for the Discrete Component
Preliminaries.
In this section we will analyze the process introduced in Section 2 more scrupulously. We will add an intermediate control level M 1 < M and incorporate it into the functional Φ µ<ν of (2.26). The information associated with the M 1 -threshold will become more conclusive on what leads to critical threshold crossings of the network. The idea of an auxiliary threshold stems from Dshalalow and Ke [8] applied there to stochastic games, with different utility and development compared to the present paper. We define the corresponding exit indices
A realization of process X ⊗ Y ⊗ T (of losses defined in (2.9)) in Figure 1 illustrates how it operates with respect to the introduced main and auxiliary thresholds. We can regard X ⊗ Y ⊗ T as a two-dimensional random walk on a random grid (rather than traditional lattice). We have a rectangular region formed of rectangular sectors in white, green, and red colors. In real-time a "particle" tries to escape the white-green area at the first opportune time when the cumulative loss of nodes exceeds M or the cumulative weight loss exceeds V , whichever comes first. It leaves a polygonal path in blue and a cruder, observed, path ingreen. The particle enters the green area indicating that a lower threshold M 1 is crossed, while neither M nor V was. In reality, the green area can be empty with a positive probability.
In the figure, the underlying real-time process (the blue dots) represents the real-time incoming Here, the operator we will use contains an additional discrete transform D q corresponding to the and M , respectively). This is a critical asset for our strategy of obtaining closed-form functionals.
Lemma 3.1 (M 1 -Level Insensitivity).
Proof. Let
We have
Applying operator (3.4)) we have The extended functional,
carries refined information about the cumulative damage upon crossing M 1 , as well as upon the other reference times. Theorem 3.2 below will establish an explicit formula for Φ µ1<µ<ν .
Having (2.7)-(2.8) in mind and replacing the abbreviations of Section 2, we denote 
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 2.1, we will apply an analog of the LCD operator (3.4) to
The functional Φ µ1<µ<ν becomes
We first arrive at Analogous to the proof in Theorem 2.1, we have
Using Theorem 2.2, n>k R 5kn = 1. The other summations converge similarly, so
The assertion of the theorem follows upon application of operator D i.e. a functional restricted to {µ 1 < min {µ, ν}}: 
We derived the first functional in Theorem 3.2, and we find the others in the following two results whose proofs are analogous to Theorem 3.2. 
Combining results 3.2-3.4, by linearity we can add them for the general functional. 
In the next two sections, we will demonstrate analytical and numerical tractability of results derived by this approach by carrying out the inverse operators for several practical special cases.
We begin with Model 1 in which the status of the network is updated upon a deterministic process, which is a reasonable assumption for many practical cases where periodic measurements are taken, as opposed to Model 2 of Section 5 in which the information about the network is collected upon random times in accordance with a specified Poisson point process (thus, with exponentially distributed inter-observation times). These two cases together represent most common types of statistical data collection.
There are other differences between the two models. In Model 1 (with "constant observations")
we assume that the number of nodes stricken in a single attack is limited by a finite number R, with no further restriction upon its distribution. The associated weight of a stricken node is assumed to be gamma distributed. In Model 2 (with "exponential observations"), the number of nodes stricken in one attack is geometrically distributed, whereas the weight associated with each node is exponentially distributed. It seems as though the assumptions made in Model 1 are more challenging than those in Model 2, although they are rather different.
Model 1. Constant Observations
In this section, we will present fully explicit probabilistic results for a special case of the process with the M 1 -auxiliary threshold (Model 1), under the following assumptions.
1. As previously, the attack times {t 1 , t 2 , ...} form a Poisson point process of rate λ.
Inter-observation times are constant, that is, ∆
3. Nodes lost per strike have an arbitrary finite discrete distribution, i.e. We note that deterministic observations always present a more challenging case in the context of a stochastic system than random observations. Furthermore, we restrict the total number of nodes destroyed in a single strike by a finite number R, which of course can be made arbitrarily large, thereby imposing literally no restriction on the distribution of perished nodes. The general gamma distribution of weight of a single node is also very general. Yet, as we will see, the main indicator of the network status will be established in a closed form functional.
To find marginal transforms we use the γ-functional of the increment of the process upon observations (as per Lemma A.1),
By Theorem 3.5 and due to Assumption 5,
Furthermore, or V (i.e. on the trace σ-algebra F (Ω) ∩ {µ 1 < min {µ, ν}}) satisfies the following formula:
is the polylogarithm, which is numerically tractable for our domain {e −w : Re (w) > 0} with s ∈ Z ≤0 ,
Γ(x) is the upper regularized gamma function, Γ (x, y) is the incomplete gamma function, and Γ (x) is the gamma function.
Proof. By (4.2),
7)
A := e −cθy
1 − e −cθxy , (4.8)
1 − e −cθxy , (4.9)
Re(cθ xy ) > 0, so e −cθxy < 1, so we can find
By the multinomial theorem,
where C jk (p) =
Returning to (4.8),
For convenience, we denote this
(4.12)
Combining (4.12)-(4.13), we find
to (4.14) and using properties (i, iv) of the inverse operator given in Appendix B,
we get
to (4.15) with properties (i, iii, iv ), we have (showing only main transitions),
ps(uly)
Returning to (4.9), we apply the same procedure to B, 
Subtracting (4.20) from (4.17) yields the desired result.
Remark 4.2. Through simulation of the process, we were able to produce some verification of the results via numerical examples. For two sets of parameters of the process with
we generated 100 realizations of the process for each of a range of M 1 values and calculated the empirical probabilities P {µ 1 < min {µ, ν}} for each:
Model 2. Exponential Observations
In this section, we will offer fully explicit formulas for another special case of the process with the M 1 -auxiliary threshold (Model 2), under the following assumptions.
1. The attack times {t 1 , t 2 , ...} form a Poisson point process of rate λ Using these, we find explicit marginal transforms. As in Section 4, we use the functional of the increment of the process upon observations (as shown in Lemma A.1),
Inter-observation times ∆
By Theorem 3.5 and Assumption 5,
The Joint Transform upon τ µ 1
We will find the joint transform of the process upon the observed M 1 -crossing and deduce some useful results from it, i.e.
We introduce some notation convenient for the forthcoming results
We will also use the convention 
After inputting parameters and using (5.4)-(5.6), we have
where , where 
Next, we need to apply LC −1 w (·) (V ) to the results of (5.13)-(5.14), for M > M 1 + 1:
A more convenient form is as follows:
Next, we will apply LC For M = M 1 + 1, the inverse Laplace-Carson transform reduces to
The first fact we deduce from the joint transform above is the probability that the observed M 1 crossing occurs before crossing of an observed M or V . (1, 1, 1, 1, 0 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) = E 1 {µ1<min{µ,ν}} = P {µ 1 < min {µ, ν}} 
The Joint Transform upon τ min{µ,ν}
In this subsection, we will find the joint transform of the process upon the first observed crossing of M or V . By (5.2), the desired transform is We will use the following additional notation, 
Proof. The following term is independent of x. 
hy−h * hy , and µ µ+h * similarly and combining with the above yields
2 . We can now apply D M −1 y to (5.27), using properties (i, iii, vi ) of the inverse operator as given in Appendix B,
Next, we need to apply LC −1 w (·) (V ) to (5.28) . Notice that each non-constant term (with respect to w) is of the form l k 1−dαl , so we establish a result for an arbitrary k. We have
w here is the same as in (5.16) with M 1 = k, v = β, and θ = h, so we have 
Marginal Transforms upon τ min{µ,ν}
Next, we find the marginal transforms of each component upon τ min{µ,ν} , the first observed crossing of M or V . These readily follow from the joint functional of the previous section by adjusting the values of α, β, and h. 
Summary
In this article we deal with the detection and prediction of losses due to cyber attacks waged on large-scale vital networks. We model the accumulation of losses to a network during a series of hostile attacks by a 2-dimensional monotone random walk process as observed by an independent delayed renewal process. 
A Forthcoming and Future Work.
We continue our research on strategic networks in two directions. First, we plan to further refine the obtained predicted data hindered by an eventual crudeness of observations. This will be rendered by means of so-called "time sensitive analysis." The latter is a completely different technique applied to continuous time parameter processes and it will allow us to obtain the underlying distributions in any vicinity of the first passage time reviving missed moments of attacks due to delayed observations. These measures may yield a more accurate information about the status of the network than those delivered by auxiliary thresholds. The method of auxiliary thresholds will thus be replaced by the time sensitive analysis, although a combination of both techniques is not excluded. Independent of this refinement, we also plan to introduce strategic defense of finite networks, which can be utilized to random walks on smaller scale graphs.
B Properties of the Inverse Operator D k
In this appendix, we mention some useful properties of the inverse operator D k , as defined in (2.21).
(i) D k is a linear functional.
(ii) D k x (1 (x)) = 1, where 1(x) = 1 for all x ∈ R.
(iii) If g is an analytic function at 0, then
(g (x)) . 
